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Abstract
Background: Tort law has legitimate social purposes of deterrence, punishment and compensation, but medical tort 
law does none of these well. Tort law could be counterproductive in medicine, encouraging costly defensive practices 
that harm some patients, restricting access to care in some settings and discouraging innovation.
Discussion: Patients might be better served by purchasing combined health and life insurance policies and waiving 
their right to pursue malpractice claims. The combined policy should encourage the insurer to profit by inexpensively 
delaying policyholders' deaths. A health and life insurer would attempt to minimize mortal risks to policyholders from 
any cause, including medical mistakes and could therefore pursue systematic quality improvement efforts. If 
policyholders trust the insurer to seek, develop and reward genuinely effective care; identify, deter and remediate poor 
care; and compensate survivors through the no-fault process of paying life insurance benefits, then tort law is largely 
redundant and the right to sue may be waived. If expensive defensive medicine can be avoided, that savings alone 
could pay for fairly large life insurance policies.
Summary: Insurers are maligned largely because of their logical response to incentives that are misaligned with the 
interests of patients and physicians in the United States. Patient, provider and insurer incentives could be realigned by 
combining health and life insurance, allowing the insurer to use its considerable information access and analytic power 
to improve patient care. This arrangement would address the social goals of malpractice torts, so that policyholders 
could rationally waive their right to sue.
Background
Health care is a risky endeavor [1]. The industry has
made some progress in improving safety following the
Institute of Medicine report, "To err is human", but mal-
practice reforms to reduce blame and improve account-
ability have lagged consistently [2].
Malpractice tort law has three theoretically important
purposes [3]. First, threats of malpractice suits should
deter physicians from practicing beyond their expertise.
Second, malpractice suits should punish those who prac-
tice low quality care. Third, malpractice awards are a pro-
cess for compensating patients injured by low quality
care. One might hope that by achieving these purposes,
malpractice tort law would further the broader goals of
better health care and outcomes.
Unfortunately, current malpractice tort law does none
of these tasks very well. Malpractice suits are not sensi-
tive: real injuries are common but seldom pursued and
only a small fraction result in paid claims [4-10]. This is in
part due to the difficulty of detecting negligence: patients
may file suits just to learn whether negligence occurred
[11]. Malpractice suits are not specific: many invalid
claims are paid and may be paid in proportion to the
injury suffered rather than the quality of care delivered
[9]. A recent review described a "good correlation"
between the strength of evidence for medical negligence
and physicians' probability of losing a malpractice trial
[12], but correlation is not accuracy. Physicians lost 10-
20% of cases with weak evidence of negligence, while
patients won only 50% of cases with strong evidence of
negligence. Malpractice claim history is predictive of
future malpractice claims [13,14], but such claims largely
reflect poor interpersonal skills [15-17]. High quality
training may reduce risk [18] but in some cases the most
knowledgeable physicians have been more likely to be
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sued than their peers [19]. In one specialty, board certi-
fied physicians experienced fewer state disciplinary
actions than non-certified physicians, but equal numbers
of malpractice claims [20]. It is therefore not at all clear
that malpractice tort law compensates victims of medical
mistakes or identifies clinically incompetent physicians.
Furthermore, adverse events are about equally frequent
in malpractice tort systems and less expensive "no fault"
systems for compensating disabled patients [21,22].
These observations suggest that malpractice tort law does
no better at preventing mistakes or compensating victims
than alternative systems.
Malpractice tort law has important unintended effects.
Believing that they face a capricious threat of losing time,
money and reputation, many physicians practice expen-
sive defensive medicine [23-27]. The annual cost of
defensive medicine in the United States is substantial,
possibly as high as $100 billion [26,28-30]. Defensive
medicine can be harmful as well [25,31]. For instance, all
x-ray images entail at least a small risk of causing cancer
[32]. Collectively, defensive radiographic imaging could
pose a non-trivial public health problem [33]. False posi-
tive test results can initiate an injurious and expensive
cascade of events. Still worse, high risk of malpractice
suits may discourage technically qualified physicians
from offering services that would benefit patients [25,34-
37]. The unintended consequences of malpractice torts
could cause harm without offsetting benefits to society.
Constructive change has been hard to achieve. A small
survey reported that physicians do not believe that law-
yers have the moral authority to guide medical practice
and would prefer physician-led quality control measures
[38]. Deliberate quality control efforts can reduce harm-
ful variation in practice, decrease adverse events and pre-
vent litigation [39-41]. In a particularly dramatic example,
application of quality control methods to the very com-
plex problem of ventilator management for adult respira-
tory distress syndrome (ARDS) patients improved their
survival from less than 10% to more than 40%. The
improvement occurred before the investigators learned
anything new about adjusting ventilator settings for
ARDS patients [40]. This is evidence-based medicine at
its best: not an artificially constrained trial, but an
exhaustive effort by dedicated clinicians informed by
comprehensive observational data collection and analysis
to make sense of the consequences of their actions for a
wide range of patients. It was possible, at least in princi-
ple, for any hospital to deliver comparable care to ARDS
patients, but only one group of researchers perceived a
need to standardize a complex and variable health care
process as a prerequisite for their studies. Physician-led
quality control can be very effective, but is rare and usu-
ally addresses less complex problems than ARDS.
No-fault compensation for poor medical outcomes and
independent arbitration are less confrontational and
potentially less expensive complements to malpractice
tort law. Apology laws have been advocated as another
means of indirectly reducing medical error, ideally in
combination with no-fault compensation [42]. However,
United States citizens cannot be forced to accept these
processes in place of malpractice torts, because the sev-
enth amendment to the US Constitution guarantees trials
by jury when sums of $20 or more are in question. The
right can be abridged by legislative acts only if the justice
system agrees that a compelling argument favors the
abridgement. Therefore, US citizens would have to be
persuaded by some compelling argument to waive this
right. Guaranteed compensation would help, but it is not
clear how strongly this would encourage general
improvements in the quality of medical outcomes unless
health care insurers provide the guarantee.
Physicians often call for caps on malpractice awards
[43]. This may reduce malpractice insurance costs and
even state health care costs [44], although a recent analy-
sis suggests no effect [45]. Some argue that caps are not
nearly ambitious enough reforms and call for a new sys-
tem of medical justice [46,47], but sweeping reform is
unlikely [43]. Other countries restrain malpractice activ-
ity by avoiding jury trials and contingency fees, restrict-
ing pretrial discovery and forcing the loser to pay the
legal costs of the winner [48]. Caps and stronger reforms
leave physician reputations at risk and the prospect of
defending a suit remains daunting. The path of least resis-
tance still may be to charge a patient, or an insurance
pool, for a test that suggests that the physician left no
stone unturned in the effort to serve the patient, even if
the test has negative expected value and drains the insur-
ance pool. Physicians facing any serious threat of mal-
practice suits are likely to feel similar pressure.
Furthermore, these reforms do not provide direct incen-
tives to improve patient care.
The Obama administration has rejected major tort
reform as a component of federal health care reform.
However, the administration has acknowledged that state
experiments in tort reform could be instructive. The fol-
lowing discussion describes a possible insurance reform
that could be implemented by states and how it might
obviate medical tort law.
Discussion
Health and Life Insurance
There is only one group in the US health care industry
that routinely collects enough data to monitor, compare
and reward quality care. That group is not patients, phy-
sicians, pharmaceutical companies, public health agen-
cies, hospitals, academics, or politicians. It is insurers.
That every other group views insurers with deep andSumner BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:150
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largely justified distrust is a tragic result of misaligned
incentives: insurers increase profits by collecting premi-
ums and not paying claims. Insurers must maintain a suf-
ficiently respectable reputation to collect premiums from
policyholders and must abide by contracts. A tense rela-
tionship with health care providers and patients is not
surprising.
Combining health and life insurance in a single long-
term policy should realign insurers' incentives and lend
credibility to many insurer decisions [49,50]. Policyhold-
ers would pay insurance premiums for both health and
life insurance, while the insurer would reimburse medical
care. When a policyholder died, the insurer would pay a
death benefit to the policyholder's designated beneficia-
ries. Neither the insurer nor the policyholder could casu-
ally terminate the relationship. Policies that endure a
minimum of 5 years would give insurers the opportunity
to reap some short-term reward for influencing health.
Policyholders could use a combination of term and per-
manent life insurance to convey longevity preferences to
the insurer. Term policies convey interest in avoiding fatal
accidents, while permanent policies (variable and whole
life insurance) imply interest in longevity. Ideally, a basic
policy would be established relatively early in life, with
the expectation that policyholders could negotiate
amendments to the life insurance policy. As in any viable
insurance program, policyholders would need to initiate
coverage while healthy, or pay a premium to purchase
coverage with a pre-existing condition.
The insurer could profit in two ways. First, it could
keep aggregate spending on health care below the sum of
collections of health insurance premiums. Second, it
could earn more from invested life insurance premiums
than it pays in life insurance benefits if it can increase
average life expectancy, whether by preventing accidental
deaths, increasing longevity, or both. If the insurer finds
inexpensive ways to heal, maintain health and extend lon-
gevity, the policyholders benefit. Conversely, neglect and
other health care mistakes are likely to manifest as losses
on life insurance and increased long-term health costs.
This should create a tense resource allocation decision. It
needs to be shared, as much as possible, between suffer-
ing patients, harried physicians and well-informed, highly
analytical insurers.
The insurer could take a very broad perspective regard-
ing policyholders' health. Profitable activities could be as
diverse as lobbying against anti-health interests, subsidiz-
ing healthy behaviors and reducing environmental risks.
A health and life insurer should have an especially strong
interest in the quality of medical care provided to policy-
holders. In many situations, the insurer could profit twice
from directing policyholders to high quality care, once if
the care succeeds in avoiding complications and disability
that would create additional medical expenses and again
if the care reduces mortal risk. Conversely, the insurer
would pay twice for failure to obtain high quality care for
the average policyholder. Therefore, the insurer could
reimburse health care systems or even individual physi-
cians based on the quality of the care they deliver.
Health and life insurers would have incentives to
develop nuanced measures of the quality of care. Pay for
performance initiatives typically use simple quality mea-
sures and may not change outcomes appreciably [51-56].
Simple quality measures, such as the fraction of diabetics
whose hemoglobin A1c is below 7%, could encourage
physicians to avoid or drop patients who do not meet the
precise goal [57]. Simple quality measures also are likely
to focus too much attention on marginal improvements
that are not cost-effective with respect to health. For
instance, a provider might have greater financial incen-
tive to help five patients reduce their hemoglobin A1c
from 7.1% to 7% than to invest effort in a difficult patient
at 10%. In contrast, a health and life insurer should
reward providers who manage to reduce challenging dia-
betics' hemoglobin A1c from 10% to 8%, because this
reduces long-term risk substantially. This is an example
of a medical version of economists' "law of diminishing
returns" and likely applies to every numeric goal in medi-
cine: the greatest risk reduction occurs as extreme values
move toward a more normal goal, not when the goal is
reached.
The health and life insurer also should maintain a
healthy skepticism regarding extrapolated quality mea-
sures. For instance, anticoagulation to prevent blood clots
is clearly valuable for many orthopedic surgery patients,
but involves serious trade-offs and may not change short-
term mortality among internal medicine inpatients [58].
Nevertheless, thromboprophylaxis is a common quality
measure in both orthopedic and medical settings. A
health and life insurer could reasonably and credibly
reject thromboprophylaxis as a quality measure in medi-
cal settings, or develop a nuanced policy identifying sub-
sets of medical inpatients who do benefit from
thromboprophylaxis. A similar analysis could address the
recent controversy regarding breast cancer screening
among women under age 50 [59]. Interestingly, the
insurer might reject or endorse routine early mammogra-
phy based largely on policyholders' life insurance pur-
chases.
These calculations suggest a reimbursement strategy
that could be called "fee for expected benefit" [60]. A
health and life insurer has an opportunity to divide the
profits accrued by delaying deaths, avoiding complica-
tions and reducing unnecessary care among providers
and patients. The policyholder's life insurance purchases,
the diseases suffered and providers' skill determine the
treatment strategy and the profit that could be shared.
The insurer could tailor these reimbursements to rein-Sumner BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:150
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force the careful teamwork required to achieve significant
benefits for patients [61]. Most importantly, a health and
life insurer paying fees for expected benefits should gain
the credibility needed to reduce or deny payment for use-
less or overly expensive treatments - if the service could
save costs by reducing disability and death at a reasonable
price, the insurer would pay for it.
Replacing Malpractice Suits
Health and life insurers would provide nearly all of the
social benefits of tort law. The insurer could reward and
penalize providers based on average patient outcomes.
Observing poorly executed care, the insurer should
demand quality improvements or end reimbursements.
The insurer increases profits when it employs providers
who have, or can learn, the skills required to manage
high-risk cases. In under-served settings, insurers might
encourage and guide expansion of primary care physi-
cians' services. If insurers are competing for high quality
services for policyholders, then the insurers should spend
to retain the most skilled physicians. This should encour-
age physicians to hone their skills, stay current with
evolving treatment, monitor their patients' outcomes and
s e e k  a s s i s t a n c e  w h e n  n e e d e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  r i s k  m i s h a p s
that could threaten personal income. These penalties and
rewards should address the social goals of confining clini-
cians' scope of practice to areas of competence and pun-
ishing low quality care.
Health and life insurers will always pay a price for inju-
rious medical mistakes, whether or not mistakes come to
the attention of patients, their families, or the judicial sys-
tem. The insurance beneficiaries of patients who die from
medical mistakes are always compensated. Young
patients who die can leave fairly large settlements to their
survivors by purchasing inexpensive term life policies.
The life insurance benefit therefore establishes a no-fault
process for compensating the survivors of patients who
suffer fatal medical mistakes. After non-fatal mistakes,
the insurer often will pay a new stream of health care
expenses. A health and life insurance policy also could
include disability insurance, comprising at least a provi-
sion to suspend premium payments in the event of dis-
ability. This would further encourage insurers to reduce
non-fatal mistakes. The insurer will consistently compen-
sate victims of low quality care, or their estates, thus
addressing the third goal of tort law.
Policyholders may be willing to waive their right to jury
trials if they trust health and life insurers to identify and
then discourage or remediate poor quality care, encour-
age and refine high quality care and stand by them or
compensate their survivors after adverse events. Optional
independent adverse event review panels could provide
arbitration and root cause analysis services.
If the health insurance premium is held constant, the
savings from avoiding defensive medicine could subsidize
the life insurance policy. If defensive medicine actually
costs $100 billion per year in a nation of 300 million per-
sons and could be eliminated by replacing malpractice
threats with more constructive quality improvement pro-
cesses, then the implied annual per capita savings could
exceed $300. For healthy middle-age male non-smokers,
that savings is enough to pay the entire premium for
$100,000 of term life insurance. Alternatively, over 15
years the savings could pay for about $8,000 of whole life
insurance. While the costs of defensive medicine are not
likely to be distributed evenly across the population, sav-
ings on this scale should be available to large insurers.
If a health and life insurer can curtail unnecessary care,
a much larger amount of money could be available to sub-
sidize life insurance purchases. According to the World
Health Organization Statistical Information System
(WHOSIS), among western nations in 2006, the United
States spent $3,100 to $4,200 more per capita on health
care than Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zea-
land, Sweden, or the United Kingdom, yet US citizens
faced a 109/1,000 risk of death between ages 15 and 60,
20% to 50% higher than the other nations [62]. At a state
or national level, most of this money should be transfer-
able from health care to life insurance without reducing
life expectancy. Pockets of high-quality, low-cost health
care in the USA convincingly demonstrate that the goal is
practical [63]; what remains to be discovered is a means
of consistently motivating such success. A health and life
insurer in the USA should find many opportunities to
profit by reducing health expenses and extending lives.
Physician role
Health and life insurance should not reduce the practice
of medicine to algorithmic care, although there is some
danger of that outcome. Rather, these insurers will need
to work with expert clinicians to understand as many pre-
dictable nuances of diagnosis and treatment as possible.
Insurers should prize clinicians who are discriminating
history takers, expert physical examiners, selective tes-
ters, accurate diagnosticians, and clever patient managers
when these skills reduce costs or improve outcomes.
Insurers should strive to develop and support these clini-
cians, as only insurers could.
Summary
Combining health and life insurance could reconcile the
health interests of patients with the financial interests of
one of the best-informed but least trusted industries in
health care. Negotiations between these parties could
provide an objective foundation for setting the prices of
many medical goods and services. One of the potential
benefits is that properly implemented health and lifeSumner BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:150
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insurance should consistently promote the social goals
that malpractice lawsuits promote so inconsistently, with
direct and indirect cost savings. The savings from avoid-
ing malpractice suits and defensive medical practice
could substantially offset the cost of life insurance for pol-
icyholders.
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